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Economic Effects of Standard-Like Nontariff Measures:  
Analytical and Methodological Dimensions 
John C Beghin (Iowa State University) and Bo Xiong (State of California)* 
This draft: October 20, 2016 
 
Summary: We provide a selective review of the empirical international trade literature on 
nontariff measures (NTMs) acting like standards–the so-called technical measures under the 
MAST classification. This review focuses on analytical and methodological dimensions involved 
in evaluating these NTMs and their economic effects, and draws from established approaches to 
measure standard-like NTMs and rigorous models used to quantify their effects on trade and 
welfare. The quantification of technical measures and the assessment of their effects are often 
entangled. We present each of these major approaches and methodologies with some formalism 
and details to help guide future investigations of technical measures select a suitable approach 
for their empirical strategy. An annex contains a more advanced technical formulation for 
interested readers. We also identify respective and potential pitfalls of each approach and 
methodology. Promising research directions are suggested for further work quantifying and 
assessing the economic effects of standard-like NTMs. 
 
*This paper was commissioned by UNCTAD. We thank Alessandro Nicita for his comments on 
previous drafts.
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Introduction 
We provide a selective review of the literature on the economic effects of nontariff measures 
(NTMs). Our focus is methodological. We provide a fairly detailed review of selected 
contributions but with important information for interested readers to undertake their own 
investigations using one of the approaches reviewed here. For a more comprehensive coverage of 
the literature on standard-like NTMs we refer readers to Beghin, Maertens, and Swinnen (2015). 
NTMs have proliferated in world trade as custom duties and quantitative restrictions are 
progressively reduced or eliminated by numerous bilateral, regional, or multilateral trade 
agreements (World Trade Report, 2012). Figure 1 shows the classification of NTMs according to 
the recent MAST classification project of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). 
Figure 1. MAST classification. 
Technical 
Measures 
Affecting Imports 
A. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
B. TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
C. PRE-SHIPMENT INSPECTION AND OTHER FORMALITIES 
Non- Technical 
Measures 
Affecting Imports 
D. CONTINGENT TRADE-PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
E. NON-AUTOMATIC LICENSING, QUOTAS, PROHIBITIONS AND QUANTITY-
CONTROL, MEASURES OTHER THAN FOR SPS OR TBT REASONS 
F. PRICE-CONTROL MEASURES, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL TAXES AND CHARGES 
G. FINANCE MEASURES 
H. MEASURES AFFECTING COMPETITION 
I. TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES 
J. DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS 
K. RESTRICTIONS ON POST-SALES SERVICES 
L. SUBSIDIES (EXCLUDING EXPORT SUBSIDIES UNDER P7) 
M. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT RESTRICTIONS 
N. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
O. RULES OF ORIGIN 
Measures 
Affecting Exports  P. EXPORT-RELATED MEASURES 
Source: International classification of non-tariff measures, UNCTAD 2012. 
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Technical measures (groups A, B, and C in Figure 1) are the focal point of our selective 
review, although many implications discussed in this review also extend to other NTM 
categories. In particular, we focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs), and other technical measures, which often take the form of standards to 
be met by imports as well as their domestic counterparts. For example, food commodities, either 
imported or domestically produced, are subject to the testing of residues of additives, pesticides, 
or other substances hazardous to human health, animal health, or the environment. Member 
states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are required to notify the organization before a 
SPS measure or a TBT is in force. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, both the SPS and TBT 
notifications are on the rise since the WTO agreements on SPS and TBTs took effect. 
 
Figure 2. Number of (new and modified) SPS notifications, 2000–2015. 
 
Source: WTO 2015. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
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Figure 3. Number of (new and modified) TBT notifications, 1995-2015. 
Source: WTO 2016. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
The economic analysis of standard-like NTMs is challenging for two reasons. First, these 
standard-like NTMs are difficult to characterize and quantify in a systemic way. The specific 
policies underlying these NTMs are often heterogeneous (e.g., labeling requirement, 
documentation, inspection, residue standards, all in a single regulation). Hence, they can 
interfere with various activities in markets or non-market settings. Existing proxies used to 
measure them can be imprecise or unrepresentative of the overall regulatory regime. 
Second, the impacts of standard-like NTMs on trade and welfare are more complex than 
the effects of tariff schemes or border taxation because some NTMs address informational issues 
in the marketplace, or generate social benefits that are external to markets, or both. Externalities 
can arise in consumption or production. Health hazards of consuming unsafe food imports is an 
example of the former and invasive species decreasing yields in domestic agriculture is an 
example of the latter. Several NTMs could address a similar market imperfection and each of 
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these NTMs has its own welfare implications. Some may increase welfare and others may 
decrease welfare because they are poorly targeted or overly stringent. Typically, most NTMs 
induce higher cost in production for most suppliers, and raise the price at the border for imported 
goods. These costs and potential benefits, including external ones, have to be combined into a 
cost-benefit analysis to assess their aggregate impact and to potentially rank the NTMs to sort 
good and bad policies. In spite of these challenges, economists have made significant progress to 
quantify these NTMs and assess their impact on markets and society’s welfare.  
Several approaches have been used to measure and quantify these standard-like NTMs, 
and assess their impact on trade and welfare. In this review, we provide an established 
conceptual framework to analyze standard-like NTMs and assess their welfare and trade effects. 
We also review the major measurements of standard-like NTMs found in the economic literature. 
We survey a range of established and promising approaches to assess their implications for trade 
and welfare. For each of these measurements and approaches, we identify the respective 
strengths, weaknesses, and applicability in various scopes of economic research. Whenever 
possible, we provide implementation steps to guide users to adopt these tools in their own 
investigations of NTMs.  
 
1. An intuitive conceptual framework to analyze standard-like NTMs 
The economics of technical measures in a market can be graphically explained by the shifts of 
supply and demand for the product of interest (e.g., Josling, Orden, and Roberts, 2004; Fugazza, 
2013; Van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette, 2009). First, we’ll look at supply. A technical 
measure may increase the costs borne by foreign and domestic suppliers at various stages of the 
supply chain. In a supply-and-demand diagram, the effects can be captured by upward shifts of 
supply curves, as shown in figure 4 for an importable good in a small country. Domestic supply 
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is denoted by y, domestic demand by x, imports by m, NTM indicates the new policy put in place, 
and world price is wp. The figure first shows the shift upward of the horizontal world supply 
induced by the added cost of the NTM, t(NTM), at the border of the small country. The 
horizontal import supply curve moves from wp to wp+t(NTM). The figure also shows the shift of 
the domestic supply from y to y’ (to the left) for the same reason. The two shifts do not have to 
be equal, unless the cost structures of domestic and foreign suppliers are identical and their 
ability to meet the new standard is equal. Hence, the technical measure could have a protective 
(anti-protective) effect on domestic producers if they meet the new standard more easily (with 
more difficulties) than foreign producers do. Figure 4 shows the NTM being slightly protective 
in this illustration. In summary, the magnitudes of the supply shifts depend on individual 
suppliers’ ability to comply with the measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. The supply shifts induced by a cost-increasing technical measure 
While less frequent, but not implausible, a measure could reduce a detrimental external 
effect born by domestic suppliers, say, brought about by foreign suppliers (e.g., a measure 
related to an exotic pest brought by imports prior to the measure). In this case, the impacts on 
domestic and foreign supply will have opposite directions. The policy will reduce imports by 
m(wp, NTM=0)) 
wp+t(NTM) 
x       
             y’(NTM)    y(NTM=0) 
wp 
m’(wp+t(NTM), supply shift)=x-y’(NTM) 
p 
x, y, m. 
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raising the unit cost of imports and expanding domestic supply by reducing the domestic cost (a 
reduction of the negative externality borne by domestic suppliers). This is shown in figure 5 with 
the right shift of the domestic supply and the increase in the import unit cost. The two effects 
contribute to reducing imports. Note that welfare and trade move in opposite directions. Trade 
decreases and welfare increases by reducing the external effect of the pest assuming that the 
policy is well targeted and that the gains to suppliers exceed the loss to consumers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5. Supply shifts with NTM targeting invasive pest linked to imports. 
 Now we’ll look at demand. When a consumer-based market imperfection is 
present, standard-like NTMs may affect consumption by signaling higher quality (corresponding 
to an outward shift of demand from safer or more nutritious food), or disclosing potential risks 
(corresponding to an inward shift of demand, say from a health warning label). These two 
opposite shifts are shown in figures 6 and 7, along with their trade effects and holding domestic 
supply constant for expository purposes. Imports expand under the former case and contract 
under the latter. Figure 7 also suggests that trade and welfare could move in opposite directions. 
Hence, the seemingly intuitive conjecture that trade and welfare move in tandem may not hold.  
m(wp, NTM=0)) 
wp+t(NTM) 
x 
y          y’(lower invasive pest with NTM) 
wp  
m’(wp+t(NTM), cost reducing supply shift) 
x, y, m 
p 
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Figure 6. The impact of NTMs on demand (enhancing case with safer product). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7. The impact of NTMs on demand (decreasing case with health warning). 
When put together, the shift in supply, demand, and unit import cost lead to ambiguous 
trade and welfare effects requiring some quantification. This ambiguity is shown in figure 8 for a 
demand enhancing effect and an increase in supply cost (shift to the left). Imports could increase 
or decrease when the NTM is implemented. If the increase in import unit cost is small relative to 
m(wp, NTM=0)) wp 
x, y, m 
p 
               x    x’(enhancing NTM)                       y 
m(wp+t(NTM),demand enhancing NTM) 
=x’-y  
m(wp, NTM=0)) 
 
wp 
x, y, m 
p 
x’(Demand decreasing NTM)  y 
m (wp+t(NTM),demand decreasing NTM) 
=x’-y  
 
x 
wp+t(NTM) 
wp+t(NTM) 
Page 9 of 52 
 
the outward shift in demand and left shift of supply, imports are likely to increase. Else they 
might decrease. Welfare effects depend on the decrease in producer surplus, and change in 
consumer surplus (demand enhancing effect net of the price increase). In addition, in some cases, 
the externality addressed by the NTM may not be directly affecting demand, although society’s 
welfare is at stake. In this case the cost of the externality has to be quantified and the impact of 
the NTM on the external cost has to be assessed and accounted for in the welfare analysis. See 
Van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette (2009) for such cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8. The ambiguous impact of NTMs on demand, supply, and imports. 
So far we have abstracted from protectionism. NTM policies are purely protectionist if 
they do not really address any market imperfection (e.g., risk of external effect on demand or 
supply, asymmetric information). Purely protectionist NTMs do not affect consumers in their 
consumption or their health (or any other external effect for that matter). Hence, the demand 
curve will not be influenced by a purely protectionist NTM. Protectionist policies are motivated 
by other motives such as creating rent-seeking opportunities or protecting domestic suppliers. 
m(wp, NTM=0)) 
wp+t(NTM) 
x(NTM=0))       x’              y’         y(NTM=0) 
wp 
m(wp+t(NTM), H(NTM), supply shift) 
x, y, m 
p 
m(wp+t(NTM)) 
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The latter benefit if the policy induces only a small increase (or none) in their cost at the 
margin, and if it raises the cost of competing imports significantly. The purely protectionist 
policy is shown in figure 9 below, which depicts a large increase in the unit cost of imports 
induced by the protectionist NTM and no cost increase for domestic producers. Producer surplus 
(the area under the supply and below the market price) increases for domestic producers. 
Domestic consumers lose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 9. The impact of a purely protectionist NTM on imports 
Consumer surplus falls under the new price inclusive of the taxing effect of the 
protectionist NTM, wp+t(NTM). Since there is no externality being addressed here, consumer 
surplus reflects the net welfare of the consumer. Consumer surplus decreases since price 
increases from wp to wp+t(NTM). Welfare losses to society are represented by the trapezoid 
between the free trade (in green on the world price line) and distorted imports (in purple on the 
distorted unit cost of imports). In this “pure” case, welfare and imports move in tandem. 
Formally, the above intuition can be characterized by a simple partial equilibrium 
framework (e.g., Disdier and Marette, 2010; Van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette, 2009) which 
m(wp, NTM=0)) 
wp+t(NTM) 
x(NTM=0))                y(NTM=0) 
wp 
x, y, m 
p 
m(wp+t(NTM)) 
=x-y at higher 
price 
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provides a foundation for quantitative analysis if the economic and policy parameters are 
appropriately calibrated (see Section 3.2). For NTMs affecting products beyond the targeted 
good, the potential spillover effects into related markets can be captured in a general equilibrium 
framework (Beghin, Disdier, and Marette 2015). The associated welfare and trade effects can be 
inferred using the trade restrictive indices (TRIs) and mercantile trade restrictive indices 
(MTRIs) (see Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 3.3).1 We provide such a derivation in the annex for 
technically inclined readers.  
So far, the surveyed methodologies are based on observed changes in trade flows. 
However, some NTMs can be prohibitive: the associated compliance costs are so high that the 
trade partnership is terminated altogether. These prohibitive NTMs are addressed in the 
empirical analyses of absence of trade, which explicitly account for countries’ or industries’ self-
selection to trade (see Section 3.1).2 
The common message drawn from the above-mentioned approaches (graphical, partial 
equilibrium models, and general equilibrium approaches) is that trade and welfare effects of 
standard-like NTMs are ambiguous. Unlike tariffs and border taxes that are shown to constrain 
trade and lower welfare, the implications of NTMs on trade and welfare cannot be determined a 
priori. Complex effects on consumption, production, and non-market values when these NTMs 
are implemented can increase or decrease welfare and trade can expand or contract with no direct 
mapping between welfare and trade changes. A reduction in trade could be welfare improving by 
reducing an externality linked to trade (Disdier and Marette, 2010). Effects on prices are less 
ambiguous. The preponderance of positive price effects from introducing technical measures is 
                                                 
1 A multimarket partial equilibrium approach can also be used and the TRI is then applied to a subset of sectors 
rather than the full economy (Anderson, Bannister, and Neary, 1995; Beghin, Bureau, and Park, 2003). 
2 There are also dynamic issues recently analyzed by Swinnen et al. (2015) where hysteresis can occur following 
shocks in markets. Paths of effects can diverge between two countries because of specific shocks that interact with 
the political economy of the standards in these countries. This is the frontier of knowledge regarding the analysis of 
technical measures and is beyond this review. 
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obvious because they typically raise costs for domestic and foreign suppliers. The price at the 
border goes up (Cadot and Gourdon, 2016), however, when goods are imperfect substitutes, 
reductions of external costs for a domestic industry could lead to lower equilibrium price 
differences between domestic and imported goods as explained later in section 3 under imperfect 
substitution.  
1.1. Formalizing the conceptual framework 
To formally derive the economics of technical measures and their impact on market equilibrium, 
trade, and welfare, we follow a parallel approach to that of van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette 
(2009) in partial equilibrium. The framework provides an intuitive and simple characterization 
that extends to an economy-wide approach. See the annex for a formal derivation of an 
economy-wide approach to analyzing NTMs.  
Let’s assume a simple market with the domestic supply y and demand x for a traded 
good. Imports m are equal to the residual demand (m = x-y) as in the previous figures. Let’s 
assume that there is an externality in consumption H which can be influenced by NTM policies, 
denoted NTM. In this framework, a technical measure has several effects—it can influence the 
externality (a shift in demand) and potentially raises the cost of production at home (a shift of the 
marginal cost of production) and abroad (an increase in the price at the border). The pathways of 
the welfare effects are through the externality, the impact on prices, and the impact on general-
equilibrium income.  
These welfare effects of technical measures can be assessed by using conventional 
Marshallian surplus measures based on underlying supply and demand. They indicate the welfare 
cost and benefits associated with the policy interventions on producers and consumers and the 
policy impact on the market imperfection. The impact of the NTM on the externality has to be 
included in this welfare analysis. 
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Consumer prices p comprise the world price wp assumed parametric for a small country, 
a tariff τ, and the price equivalent t of the domestic NTM imposed at the border on foreign 
suppliers allowing them to sell in the domestic market, or p = wp + τ + t(NTM). The impact of 
technical measures on demand ( /x NTM∂ ∂ ) is ambiguous as explained before.  
On the production side, domestic supply y responds to producer prices, which include 
production subsidies, s, such as farm subsidies, not seen by consumers, 
( )pp wp t NTM sτ= + + + . Technical measures NTM affect the feasible set and the resource used 
to produce goods optimally ( /y NTM∂ ∂ ). The latter derivative captures the shift in supply 
brought by the technical measure(s). If the technical measure reduces the feasible set, then 
supply will shift to the left.  
Imports m are the residual excess demand or, ( , ( )) ( , )pm x p H NTM y p NTM= − . 
The latter equation captures the three effects of NTM on imports via price p with t(NTM), 
externality H, and supply y. Oone can differentiate imports m with respect to all the arguments. 
This step provides a basic trade impact induced by changes in the determinants of imports, 
including technical measures and other policy interventions in the economy. Not all these 
determinants have to change at once of course. For a particular good n determined by its own 
price, we obtain 
(1)
( / ) ( / )
[( / )( / ) ( / )( / ) / ]
n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n
dm m dp d y p ds
m dp t NTM x H H NTM y NTM dNTM
τ= ∂ − ∂ ∂ +
∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
. 
Equation (1) suggests that an empirical strategy will be necessary to separate the impact 
of technical measures in a given sector n, NTMn, on supply yn and demand xn to identify demand 
enhancing effects form supply shifts induced by higher cost of production under the technical 
measures. The annex provides a formal derivation of the welfare measure induced by the NTM. 
We return to this empirical issue in section 3. 
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2. Measurements of standard-like NTMs 
In this section, we look at the most common ways used to measure standard-like NTMs to 
implement empirical investigation of NTM regimes. As we show, it is difficult to fully 
disentangle the measurement of the NTMs from the measurement of their impact on trade or 
welfare. 
2.1.  Inventory measures based on NTM notifications with the WTO 
The WTO tracks all NTMs notified by member states pertaining to international trade in goods 
and services.3 Economic literature has suggested several measurements to capture the degree to 
which NTMs interfere with world trade. In particular, two metrics based on NTM notifications 
are widely used by economists. Henceforth, we draw from Nicita and Gourdon (2013) to 
illustrate the two measurements. 
The first measure is the frequency index, which is the percentage of imports subject to 
one or more NTM notifications. Formally, the frequency index of an importing country is 
computed as: 
(2) i i i
i i
FI D M M=∑ ∑ , 
where i designates a product, iD equals one if the product is subject to any NTM notifications 
(and zero otherwise), iM  equals one if trade takes place (and zero otherwise). Intuitively, the 
frequency index captures the proportion of imported products under any NTMs. 
There are several caveats to the frequency index. First, although equation (2) defines the 
index at the national level, it can be disaggregated by country and by sector. For example, one 
can calculate the frequency indices on a country-and-chapter basis, with the product index 
                                                 
3 See the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal of the WTO at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/itip_e.htm. 
Specifically, the database register NTMs notified by member states, with specific information about products and 
partners affected, effective date, and relevant NTM classification. 
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denoting either four- or six-digit product in the Harmonized System. Second, the frequency 
index provides a binary assessment as to whether a product is subject to NTMs, but not how 
many NTM notifications cover that product. In other words, a product under one NTM has the 
same effect as a product under a dozen NTMs. Third, the frequency index is irrelevant to trade 
volumes. That is, an NTM targeting a highly traded commodity contributes to the measurement 
in the same way as an NTM affecting a marginally traded product. 
The second measurement based on the NTM notifications is the coverage ratio, which is 
the percentage of trade values subject to NTMs. Formally, the coverage ratio is calculated as 
(3) i i i
i i
CR DV V=∑ ∑ , 
where iV  is the import value of product i in the country of interest. The coverage ratio improves 
upon the frequency index in that it gives more weight to NTMs that regulate products traded in 
large volumes.4 If NTMs are strongly impeding trade, welfare weights would be opposite to 
trade weights. Therefore, CR may not be the best measure in deriving welfare consequences of 
the policies. Comparing CR and FI values for the same sectors, and if CR is larger than FI, this 
may suggest that the policy motive may go beyond protectionism since regulated goods are 
traded. Policymakers may be addressing health concerns or other market imperfections. 
Figure 10 shows the two measures by specific categories of NTMs in 2010.5 In general, 
high-income nations implement more SPS measures and TBTs (or technical measures in general). 
Beyond technical measures, conventional protectionist measures such as quantity control remain 
widely adopted in Asia and South America. In addition, the two measurements deliver 
comparable results in most cases. The two indices are obviously useful to provide stylized facts 
                                                 
4 One shortcoming of the coverage ratio is that the weights are endogenous as trade flows are affected by NTMs. 
One way to mitigate the issue is to use trade records before the implementation of NTMs as the alternative weights. 
5 One can further extend the two measures by aggregating all types of NTMs. 
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across country groups and policy types as shown. 
 
Figure 10. Frequency indices and coverage ratios by type of NTMs, 2010. 
Source: Nicita and Gourdon (2013). 
In summary, the two measurements based on NTM notifications with the WTO provide 
an overview of the pervasiveness and frequency of standard-like NTMs in importing countries. 
However, both metrics are subject to four major issues. The first issue is inherent to the nature of 
the WTO notifications. Member states of the WTO enforce NTMs differently after the 
notification with the WTO. It is generally believed that more developed nations have better 
technical and institutional capacities to rigorously implement the NTMs. In contrast, the 
notification might not translate into actions at customs in less developed countries. Second, both 
measures treat all types of NTMs equally, even within each subgroup. Since NTM types cover a 
wide range of policy instruments, the simple aggregation of all notifications risks downplaying 
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the most restrictive measures and overstressing trivial ones. For instance, it could be the case that 
one NTM requires minimal modification to the packaging of imports, while another inflicts 
substantial compliance costs to foreign suppliers. Or, one NTM only affects producers and 
processors, while another informs consumers at the same time. Third, both measures capture the 
NTMs affecting positive trade flows. In other words, neither measure accounts for NTMs that 
prohibit trade from taking place altogether. Fourth, as discussed earlier, neither measure provides 
a count of all notifications at the product level.6  
2.2.  The ad valorem equivalent of NTMs 
Economists have also developed approaches to translate NTMs into a tax equivalent, often at the 
border, in tariff ad valorem equivalents (AVEs). These AVEs of NTMs allow researchers to 
compare the trade restrictiveness of NTMs with that of custom duties. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of these AVEs of NTMs relative to tariffs affecting the same sectors may suggest 
whether policymakers treat NTMs and tariffs as substitutes to provide protection to domestic 
industries. We review two widely used methods to derive the ad valorem equivalence of NTMs. 
The first one is the price wedge method, which focuses on the effect of NTMs in raising prices of 
imported products. The second method is proposed by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009), which 
identifies the alternative tariff rate leading to the same level of trade in the absence of NTMs. 
The two approaches are connected in the sense that both use a tax equivalent to the NTMs, 
although the basis of the equivalence may not be identical. 
2.2.1. The price wedge method 
The presence of NTMs generally drives up the price of imported goods in the destination 
markets, either via inflicting additional costs to foreign suppliers or informing domestic 
                                                 
6 Future research can improve upon the two measurements by replacing the binary indicators with a count variable 
of all notifications at the product level.  
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consumers, or both. Therefore, one can identify the contribution of NTMs to the price in the 
importing market by subtracting the price in the exporting country, tariffs, transportation costs, 
and other international business costs. That is, the residual price difference is attributed to the 
presence of NTMs. With the price effects of NTMs, one can compute the AVEs accordingly.  
The implementation of the price wedge method critically hinges on the availability of 
prices of the trade products in both the exporting and the importing countries. In a case study of 
U.S. apple exports to Japan, Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) show that, in the absence of 
comparable prices, one can leverage the substitution between domestic and imported products to 
derive the counterfactual prices. 
There are several limitations to the price wedge method. First, it requires an exhaustive 
accounting of all costs of trade. The price effect of NTMs is overestimated if certain costs of 
trade are omitted. Second, the price wedge method does not address the root cause of the price 
effect of NTMs. That is, the price effect is likely to encompass both compliance costs implied by 
NTMs and higher willingness to pay of consumers as they are better informed. Quality issues are 
also important.  
Cadot and Gourdon (2016) leverage two recent established datasets to estimate the impact 
of NTMs on observed bilateral price gaps for the same product across countries using the NTM 
variation across countries and sectors. For trade unit values (CIF), they rely on CEPII’s TUV 
dataset which contains unit values for over 173 reporters, 255 partners, and over 5000 six-digit HS 
product categories and for the period 2000–08. The bilateral CIF unit values include all trade costs 
before being taxed by the importing country. The data is based on UN Comtrade unit values. For 
NTMs they rely on the recently updated TRAINS database mentioned previously, which covers the 
range of NTMs shown in figure 1 for 65 countries. The dataset has been put into a user-friendly 
format by the CEPII including frequency and coverage indices per HS 6 sector (see NTM-MAP). 
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 These authors develop a simple model based on the trade model of Melitz (2003), with 
exporting firms in country o for product k each having a FOB “milling” price, which then gets 
turned into a bilateral CIF price by destination k by adding trade costs for the product and 
destination denoted by dkτ . The individual prices get aggregated over all exporting firms to yield 
an average CIF price which is the trade unit value, CIFodkP function of the average FOB price, the 
CIF/FOB bilateral trade cost and an aggregator term V reflecting the distribution of exporting 
firms from o to d: 
(4) .CIF FOBodk ok odk odkP P Vτ=  
Based on equation (4), one can use the variation in prices CIFodkP over destinations to 
approximate the variation of bilateral trade costs odkτ . Using single OLS regressions for each 
product, the logarithm of CIF price is explained by the usual trade cost determinants (presence of 
three NTM types, tariff factor and exogenous bilateral determinants such as distance common 
border, common language, etc.). The authors further look at the impact of preferential trade 
agreements on the price gaps including so-called deep integration clauses relying on mutual 
recognition and/or harmonization of standards and conformity assessments and transparency 
requirements. The authors find that the estimated impact of NTMs on price gap is smaller than 
previously estimated using other approaches, and with median AVEs in the single digits (5% for 
TBTs, 3% for SPS measures). They also report that RTAs and their deep integration clauses 
decrease the price-raising effect of NTMs by a quarter (via lower NTM AVEs), an intuitive 
finding. Their estimates are shown in table 1. However, they find that mutual recognition of 
technical measures has the least impact among the various types of clauses analyzed. 
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Table 1. Estimates of NTMs by HS chapter
HS Section SPS (A) TBT(B) Total SPS (A) TBT(B) Total SPS (A) TBT (B) SPS (A) TBT (B) Total
Animals 11.6 9.2 20.8 8.5 7.8 16.4 -3.1 -1.3 -26.7 -14.5 -21.3
Vegetables 9.9 10.3 20.3 9.3 6.6 15.8 -0.7 -3.8 -6.7 -36.4 -21.9
Fats & oils 8.9 8.4 17.3 4.9 7.8 12.6 -4 -0.6 -45.4 -7.6 -27
Beverages  8.1 8.4 16.5 6.6 5.3 11.9 -1.5 -3.1 -18.4 -37.3 -28.1
Minerals 1.6 7.8 9.4 1.6 5.2 6.8 0 -2.6 0.2 -33.4 -27.6
Chemicals 1 7 7.9 0.8 4.6 5.4 -0.1 -2.4 -13.6 -34.2 -31.7
Plastics 1.2 5.8 7 1.1 3.9 5 -0.1 -1.9 -9.1 -33.1 -29
Leather 2.7 3.7 6.5 1.6 2.5 4.2 -1.1 -1.2 -40.7 -31.9 -35.7
Wood prod 4.5 2.1 6.5 4.1 1.5 5.7 -0.4 -0.5 -8 -24.7 -13.3
Paper 0.7 2.5 3.3 0.5 1.6 2.1 -0.2 -0.9 -24.3 -37.3 -34.5
Textile and 0.9 4.8 5.6 0.7 3.6 4.3 -0.2 -1.2 -18 -24.5 -23.5
Footwear 0.7 4.3 5 0.6 2.6 3.2 0 -1.7 -6.7 -40.4 -35.9
Stone & gla 1.5 4.9 6.4 1.4 3.7 5.1 -0.1 -1.2 -8.2 -23.9 -20.2
Pearls 1 4.3 5.3 0.8 4.2 5 -0.2 -0.1 -21.3 -2.1 -5.6
Metals 1.2 4.6 5.8 1 2.9 3.9 -0.2 -1.6 -18.5 -35.8 -32.2
Machinery 1.5 5.2 6.7 1.2 3.6 4.8 -0.3 -1.6 -19.2 -30.6 -28
Vehicles 0.4 8.9 9.3 0.4 7.5 7.9 -0.1 -1.4 -15.5 -15.4 -15.4
Optical & m  0.8 7.5 8.3 0.7 6 6.6 -0.1 -1.6 -10.6 -20.8 -19.9
Arms 0 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.6 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellane 0.6 4.9 5.5 0.5 3.4 3.9 -0.1 -1.5 -17.7 -30.6 -29.2
Work of Art 0 2.7 2.7 0 1.7 1.7 0 -1 0 -37.8 -37.8
Average 2.8 5.6 8.4 2.2 4.1 6.3 -0.6 -1.5 -21.2 -26.5 -24.8
AVE change
Absolute (percent 
points)
Proportional (percent of 
baseline)
AVE without RTA AVE with RTA
 
Table 1. Estimates of NTMs by HS Chapter 
Source: Cadot and Gourdon (2016). 
One issue with the approach in Cadot and Gourdon (2016) is that CIF/FOB price 
variation should not depend on tariffs since they are measured before taxation at the border. In 
addition, they are only observed when bilateral trade already exists. Several selection biases 
could be at work with respect to firms, as in Melitz (2003), and also to explain when trade is 
observed or not. One could use the two-step Heckman procedure to first predict the probability to 
observe a trading pair (and a reported price) and then the observed price could be explained in a 
second step.  
2.2.2. AVEs of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) 
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) propose a method to estimate the tariff rate ad valorem 
equivalent that would result in the same level of trade in the absence of nontariff barriers (NTBs). 
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The method features a regression equation that explains imports as determined by tariffs, 
domestic support programs, core NTBs (measured by frequency indices), and other 
characteristics of the importing markets. The NTB frequency variables are based on the older 
TRAINS UNCTAD database on NTBs. Core NTBs used in Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga are 
somewhat different from the so-called core NTBs defined originally by UNCTAD (see Bora, 
Kuwahara, and Laird, 2002). Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga include Price control measures 
(TRAINS codes 6100, 6200, and 6300), Quantity restrictions (TRAINS codes 3100, 3200, and 
3300), Monopolistic measures (TRAINS code 7000), and Technical regulations (TRAINS code 
8100). Interestingly, although technical measures are not fully included in these “core” NTBs 
(codes 8200 to 8900 are omitted), these AVEs of core NTBs have been used in many 
investigations of technical measures. The authors derive the AVEs of NTBs from the estimated 
coefficients of NTBs and given elasticities of import demand from Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 
(2008). Table 2 displays their empirical results. As shown in the table, the aggregate AVEs of 
NTBs vary between 30% and 50% in most countries. The authors have made their sectoral 
estimates available through the World Bank’s research department webpage on AVEs of NTBs. 
Specifically, Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) deploy the following regression equation: 
(5) 
, , , , , ,
, , ,
ln ln(1 ) exp( )
exp( ) ln ,
k core core k
n c n c n c n n k c n n k c n c
k k
DS DS k
n n k c n c n c
k
m t C C Core
C DS
ε α α β β
β β κ
− + = + − + −
+ +
∑ ∑
∑
  
where ,n cm  denotes the value of import of product n in country c, ,n cε  is the elasticity of import 
demand, ,n ct  is the ad valorem tariff rate, nα is the product fixed effect, 
k
cC  captures national 
characteristics, ,n cCore  is the NTM variable as measured by frequency index, and ,n cDS  controls 
for the degree of domestic support. The estimation of equation (5) is subject to potential 
endogeneity of NTMs and domestic supports because surging imports tend to induce more 
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protectionist policies (Trefler, 1993). Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) use instrumental 
variables to address the problem. In particular, the authors use GDP-weighted average of NTM 
(and domestic support) measurements in neighboring countries as the instrument for the NTM 
(and domestic support) variable in the country of interest. 
With the estimated parameters in equation (5), one can derive the AVE of NTMs as: 
(6) , , ,[exp( ) 1]
core core
n c n c n cave β ε= − . 
According to equation (6), the AVE of NTMs is higher if the underlying policies impair trade 
more, or if the import demand is less price elastic. 
Table 2. Aggregate AVEs of NTBs by Country 
    
AVE of 
Country 
Code Country name 
exp(beta 
core)-1 
Beta 
Domestic 
Subsidy 
Core 
NTBs all 
lines 
Core NTB if 
core NTB=1 
ALB Albania -0.008 0 0.007 0.326 
ARC Argentina -0.112 -0.001 0.1 0.389 
AUS Australia -0.105 -0.001 0.089 0.416 
BFA Burkina Faso -0.01 0 0.01 0.448 
BCD Bangladesh -0.041 0 0.036 0.339 
BLR Belarus -0.094 0 0.089 0.389 
BOL Bolivia -0.093 0 0.084 0.458 
BRA Brazil -0.206 -0.002 0.188 0.428 
BRN Brunei -0.059 0 0.053 0.399 
CAN Canada -0.06 -0.002 0.045 0.325 
CHE Switzerland -0.049 -0.001 0.041 0.29 
CHL Chile -0.09 0 0.083 0.325 
CHN China -0.076 0 0.063 0.35 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire -0.462 0 0.423 0.423 
CMR Cameroon -0.021 0 0.014 0.299 
COL Colombia -0.19 -0.003 0.174 0.354 
CRI Costa Rica -0.007 0 0.006 0.363 
CZE Czech R. -0.013 -0.001 0.011 0.191 
DZA Algeria -0.477 0 0.441 0.441 
EGY Egypt -0.447 0 0.395 0.395 
EST Estonia -0.009 0 0.007 0.288 
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ETH Ethiopia -0.004 0 0.003 0.482 
EUN European Union -0.154 -0.008 0.134 0.45 
GAB Gabon -0.003 0 0.003 0.283 
CHA Ghana -0.042 0 0.037 0.401 
GTM Guatemala -0.141 0 0.131 0.375 
HKG Hong Kong -0.031 0 0.028 0.292 
HND Honduras -0.001 0 0.001 0.543 
HUN Hungary -0.069 -0.001 0.059 0.309 
IDN Indonesia -0.065 0 0.052 0.414 
IND India -0.185 0 0.147 0.357 
ISL Iceland -0.033 0 0.026 0.361 
]OR Jordan -0.214 0 0.202 0.413 
JPN Japan -0.139 0 0.111 0.346 
KAZ Kazakhstan -0.117 0 0.107 0.425 
KEN Kenya -0.011 0 0.009 0.376 
LBN Lebanon -0.122 0 0.12 0.4 
LKA Sri Lanka -0.003 0 0.003 0.444 
LTU Lithuania -0.064 0 0.062 0.373 
LVA Latvia -0.079 0 0.068 0.398 
MAR Morocco -0.423 0 0.394 0.394 
MDA Moldova -0.021 0 0.018 0.359 
MDC Madagascar -0.005 0 0.005 0.442 
MEX Mexico -0.219 0 0.193 0.336 
MLI Mali -0.036 0 0.033 0.458 
MUS Mauritius -0.079 0 0.075 0.421 
MWI Malawi -0.026 0 0.023 0.429 
MYS Malaysia -0.355 0 0.319 0.319 
NGA Nigeria -0.5 0 0.453 0.453 
NIC Nicaragua -0.08 0 0.074 0.49 
NOR Norway -0.068 0 0.059 0.399 
NZL New  Zealand -0.155 0 0.143 0.383 
OMN Oman -0.066 0 0.058 0.431 
PER Peru -0.102 -0.008 0.089 0.367 
PHL Philippines -0.431 0 0.382 0.382 
PNG Papua N. Guinea -0.049 0 0.042 0.367 
POL Poland -0.054 -0.001 0.046 0.351 
PRY Paraguay -0.169 0 0.162 0.482 
ROM Romania -0.066 0 0.06 0.317 
RUS Russia -0.183 0 0.155 0.417 
RWA Rwanda -0.006 0 0.006 0.478 
SAU Saudi Arabia -0.05 0 0.052 0.337 
Page 24 of 52 
 
SON Sudan -0.528 0 0.481 0.481 
SEN Senegal -0.5 0 0.465 0.465 
SLV El Salvador -0.158 0 0.163 0.443 
SVN Slovenia -0.161 -0.001 0.148 0.374 
THA Thailand -0.074 0 0.061 0.386 
TTO Trinidad and T. -0.036 0 0.032 0.36 
TUN Tunisia -0.145 -0.001 0.132 0.39 
TUR Turkey -0.068 0 0.06 0.347 
TZA Tanzania -0.568 0 0.514 0.514 
UGA Uganda -0.004 0 0.004 0.482 
UKR Ukraine -0.075 0 0.069 0.421 
URY Uruguay -0.226 0 0.206 0.42 
USA United States -0.108 -0.002 0.095 0.374 
VEN Venezuela -0.123 -0.001 0.111 0.332 
ZAF South Africa -0.04 -0.002 0.032 0.33 
ZMB Zambia -0.021 0 0.019 0.443 
Source: Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009). 
The ambitious approach proposed by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) exhibits some 
drawbacks. Their measurement of NTMs is highly aggregated (see Section 2.1 for more 
discussions of the frequency indices) and amalgamates technical measures with other measures. 
Second, the regression equation in Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) constrains the role of 
NTMs to be trade-impeding. Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2015) have extended the TRI 
approach of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009), as explained in section 1, to allow NTMs to be 
either trade-facilitating or trade-impeding. They develop AVEs for frequency indices of technical 
measures. Their results suggest that 39% of product lines affected by these technical measures 
exhibit negative AVEs, meaning that they facilitate trade. 
2.3.  Heterogeneity, stringency indices and numeric measurements of NTMs 
The comparison or aggregation of different NTMs is a challenging task. NTMs encompass a 
wide range of policy instruments, ranging from Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for chemicals, 
to hygiene standards in the production process, to labeling and border inspections in the stage of 
distribution. In spite of the challenge, the economic literature has developed approaches to 
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quantify NTMs according to their policy content. In particular, Winchester et al. (2012) have 
developed ways to characterize NTMs based on their measurability as shown in table 3. They 
used data collected for a database on NTMs in the EU, USA, Canada, Japan, China, India, Brazil, 
Argentina, Australia, Russia, and New Zealand by an EU-funded project, the NTM Impact 
project. 
Table 3. Measurability of NTMs 
  Binary Ordered Quantitative 
Type of 
measure 
Rule based 
calculation 
Rank based 
qualitative or 
quantitative 
information 
Numerical 
elements  
Example 
EU regulates 
(1) and 
Australia does 
not regulate 
(0) 
(1) Argentina bans 
a product, (2) EU 
has a regulation of 
2 ppm, and (3) 
China has no 
regulation.  
Maximum residue 
levels of a specific 
substance for a 
specific product 
Source: Winchester et al. (2012). 
 
As shown in table 3, an NTM without detailed description can be captured by a binary 
variable, which takes the value of one if an NTM exists and zero otherwise. An ordered variable 
can be deployed to measure an NTM with qualitative information on its restrictiveness. A 
numeric measure is appropriate to capture an NTM containing parameter information such as 
allowable pesticide residues. 
As an attempt to compare NTMs across regions, Winchester et al. (2012) propose a 
heterogeneity index to capture the divergence of NTMs between trading partners. Specifically, 
the index is a simple aggregation of regulatory difference at the product level, which is measured 
by the distance between the NTM variable in the importing country and that in the exporting 
country. Distance is normalized by the range of the NTM variable so that different types of 
NTMs can be compared on the same scale. Formally, the index is defined as the (dis)similarity of 
requirements i between importing country d and exporting country o aggregated over all policies 
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being considered, and computed for the exporting country. This can be calculated as: 
(7) 
1
 
n
HIT
do ido
i
HIT DS
=
=∑ ,  
with  being a (dis)similarity measure for each policy being considered and defined as: 
(8) 
( ) ( )
 
max min
id ioHIT
ido
i i
x x
DS
x x
−
=
−
.  
Variable xi is the observation on requirement i (which may be binary, ordered, or quantitative 
information),7 and max(xi) and min(xi) are, respectively, the maximum and minimum value for 
requirement i across all countries considered. The dissimilarity measure scales the difference for 
requirement i between the exporting and the importing countries by the range of differences over 
all countries examined. A variation on this index is an asymmetric version accounting for the 
sign of the numerator. More stringency in the destination market may potentially hurt trade from 
a less stringent origin, whereas the opposite does not.  
The heterogeneity index is particularly appealing when analyzing the potential 
harmonization of NTMs between trading partners, because the index reduces to zero if trading 
partners endorse the same set of NTMs. The maximum value of the index is one. The index can 
then be used as a determinant in econometric investigations of bilateral trade flows. 
Next, we review an international case study of MRLs governing pesticides and veterinary 
drugs in agriculture (Li and Beghin, 2014). The MRLs in agriculture are of great interest for two 
reasons. First, excessive pesticide residue is a major issue constraining agricultural exports in the 
developing world. For instance, Xiong and Beghin (2014) show that MRLs adopted by high-
income countries tend to marginalize plant product exporters in developing countries.8 Second, 
                                                 
7 Dissimilarity based on ordinal ranks is calculated using a Podani modification of the Gower index (Podani, 1999). 
8 In a case study of tea trade, Xiong (forthcoming) further documents that pesticide residues exceeding MRLs is the 
top reason for tea imports to be rejected at U.S. customs. 
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the numeric information contained in MRLs can be readily used to evaluate the stringency of the 
regulatory regime. 
In particular, Li and Beghin (2014) compile MRLs affecting 273 products across 77 
nations in 2012.9 To assess the regulatory restrictiveness at the product level in each country, the 
authors define the following stringency index: 
(9) 
1
exp(( ) / ) /
K
c c
ij jk ijk jk
k
S MRL MRL MRL K
=
= −∑ , 
where i refers to a nation, j designates a product, k denotes a substance (pesticide or veterinary 
drug) applicable to the product, ijkMRL  is the prescribed MRL for substance k in product j in 
country i , and cjkMRL  is the MRL set by Codex for substance k in product j. The exponential 
transformation in equation (9) expresses convex cost of meeting increasing stringency. Other 
weighing schemes are possible. Intuitively, the MRL stringency index defined by equation (9) 
measures the percentage deviation of national MRLs from international counterparts, averaged 
across all hazardous substances. In particular, the index takes the value of one if a nation is fully 
aligned with Codex. A higher index corresponds to a more restrictive regime. Furthermore, one 
can construct the MRL stringency index at the country level by averaging the indices across all 
products (with import shares as the weights). Figure 11 shows the MRL stringency indices across 
nations. Stringency indices can also be developed in absence of international standards using a 
variation of the asymmetric HIT index of Winchester et al. (see Ferro, Otsuki, and Wilson, 2015). 
Aggregate stringency indices at the country level are useful to characterize a county’s regulatory 
regime. At the commodity level they can be used as a determinant of bilateral trade flows in 
econometric investigations (de Faria and Wieck, 2015; Xiong, forthcoming; Xiong and Beghin, 
2014; Ferro, Otsuki, and Wilson, 2015). 
                                                 
9 The global MRL information is available from the Global MRL Database at https://www.globalmrl.com/. 
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Figure 11. MRL stringency index by country, 2012. 
 
Map source: Beghin (2014); data source: Li and Beghin (2014). 
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All MRLs
Taiwan 2.11 (0.47)
Australia 1.93 (0.57)
Japan 1.68 (0.76)
Jamaica 1.51 (0.57)
European Union 1.51 (0.57)
Turkey 1.48 (0.55)
Canada 1.45  (0.49)
Israel 1.06 (0.21)
Brazil 1.04 (0.12)
Argentina 1.04 (0.11)
Chile 1.03 (0.14)
Russian Federation 1.03 (0.10)
Rep. of Korea 1.01 (0.15)
China 1.01 (0.05)
Malaysia 0.99 (0.04)
Unit. Arab Emirates 0.99 (0.03)
Mexico 0.99 (0.36)
United States 0.98 (0.36)
India 0.98 (0.13)
New Zealand 0.97 (0.06)
Singapore 0.96 (0.13)
South Africa 0.87 (0.14)
Sri Lanka 0.52 (0.20)
Albania 0.52 (0.20)
Country
(Equal weight across 
products) 
Protectionism Indices
MRL stringency index
 
As shown in Figure 11 and the associated table of stringency indices, developed markets 
such as the EU, Canada, Japan, and Australia implement MRLs that are more stringent than 
Codex recommendations. In contrast, developing nations generally adopt MRLs either close to or 
more lenient than the international standards.  
While the stringency index of Li and Beghin provides a useful assessment of the MRL 
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regime relative to Codex, the measurement has several limitations. First, the index only accounts 
for hazardous substances regulated by both the Codex and individual nations. Certain chemicals 
can be monitored by individual countries but absent from Codex due to the lack of scientific 
evidence or consensus. Ferro, Otsuki, and Wilson overcome this problem as noted previously. 
Second, all these indices, by averaging across all hazardous substances, could be assigning low 
weights to chemicals intensively applied in certain regions of the world. The weights to be used 
in the aggregation are an unsettled issue. 
2.4. Measures of NTM transparency and harmonization 
 “Deep integration” has been taking place under a multitude of RTAs in the last quarter of a 
century. Trade partners in these RTAs have attempted to adopt more transparent and harmonized 
regulatory regimes. In parallel, measures of NTM deep integration (transparency and 
harmonization or regulatory reciprocity) have emerged in the applied economic literature (Henry 
de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006; Vancauteren, 2013; Vancauteren and Henry de Frahan, 2011; 
Cadot and Gourdon, 2016; Lejárraga and Shepherd, 2013; Lejárraga, Shepherd, and van 
Tongeren, 2013). Transparency is surprisingly opaque, but harmonization is much less so. 
Transparency is multidimensional. It centers on reducing uncertainty, on simplification, and 
increasing predictability of the regulatory process at the border (rules of origin, conformity 
certification) in disputes and inspection, among others. Several authors (Lejárraga and Shepherd, 
2013; Lejárraga et al., 2013; Cadot and Gourdon, 2016) look at the presence of transparency 
provisions in RTAs, and their scope in an extensive series of trade agreements. They develop a 
series of count variables of transparency procedures in trade agreements or in sub-chapters of 
RTAs like on SPS and TBTs, rules of origin, dispute settlements, and reciprocity of conformity 
assessment. They also use a series of dummy variables to indicate the presence of transparency 
chapters in RTAs, reciprocity clauses, or harmonization clauses in RTAs.  
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Other authors look at “revealed transparency” by using metrics on the ease of doing 
business, the absence of bribery, and other trade facilitation measures (Turnes and Ernst, 2015). 
The latter metrics are well known and available from several sources (the World Bank ease of 
doing business indicators and for the quality of regulatory system and anti-corruption measures 
under the “Global Governance Indicators”). Other reputable sources exist for corruption 
indicators, such as Transparency International UK. Among the ease of doing business, the 
indicators related to trading across borders are the most relevant ones. These trade indicators are 
available for a panel of countries over time and are expressed as continuous variables for both 
import and export transactions (time or cost required to complete a trade transaction). Hence, 
their use appears promising. In addition, in business data, the indicators on “enforcing contracts” 
are also relevant as they gauge the quality of institution to resolve disputes. The drawback of 
these economy-wide indicators is that they substitute for country-fixed effects and are not 
specific to sectors or goods. Hence, they do not provide sectoral variation which would be 
wanted in a disaggregated econometric investigation.  
Harmonization and reciprocity in regulation are first captured by noting which policy or 
regulations have been harmonized or are under reciprocal recognition within a custom union 
(Vancauteren, 2013; Vancauteren and Henry de Frahan, 2011) or in RTAs (Cadot and Gourdon 
2016; Blind et al., 2013). Other analysts have used “revealed” harmonization measures by 
looking at a lack of harmonization for specific policies with departures from international or 
regional standards (Czubala, Shepherd, and Wilson, 2009; Xiong, forthcoming).  
Further, some investigations measure the lack of harmonization developing “regulatory” 
distance metrics by looking at the heterogeneity of policy instruments and within instruments the 
stringency of the regulation. These distance measures are in a similar spirit of the heterogeneity 
indices discussed in section 2.3 and the separation between heterogeneity and harmonization is 
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admittedly somewhat arbitrary. They differ by their range of policies considered by the type of 
normalizations and weights to aggregate them. For example, Cadot et al. (2015) use averages of 
dichotomic measures of sharing similar policy instruments, or no aggregated policies, and/or 
goods. They rely on the new Trains database previously mentioned. The advantage of their 
measure is the flexibility in aggregation. They can generate sector-specific distances that are 
useful for disaggregated trade analysis.  
Disdier, Fontagné, and Cadot (2014) capture the presence or absence of harmonization of 
NTM regulation in economic integration agreements between North-South and within South or 
within North. Looking at bilateral trade flows, the latter authors use dummy variables to indicate 
when any of the two countries is a member of an RTA, and conditioned on that, if the RTA 
includes TBT integration, harmonization to regional or international standards, and if countries 
harmonize up to more stringent standards or down to lower standards. 
These measures of transparency and harmonization can then be used in investigations of 
determinants of bilateral trade flows at various aggregation levels (sectoral at different HS levels, 
aggregate trade). The other application beyond trade flows is that of Cadot and Gourdon (2016), 
previously mentioned in section 2.2. It looks at the impact that “deep integration” has on AVE 
estimates of NTMs using price wedge data. Not all these policies matter equally to facilitate 
trade and reduce price wedges. Hence, sorting out those measures that matter most is a 
worthwhile task. 
 
3. Approaches to assess the impact of NTMs on trade and welfare  
In this section, we review empirical approaches to evaluate the effects of NTMs on international 
trade and social welfare. In section 3.1, we provide two case studies using the gravity equation 
approach to determine the trade effects of NTMs. In particular, one study investigates the impact 
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of MRLs on trade in plant products; the other assesses the trade effect of NTMs relative to other 
domestic and trade policies. In section 3.2, we review a partial equilibrium analysis that accounts 
for both the market impact of NTM policies and external effects influenced by these NTMs. A 
general equilibrium analysis of welfare effects of NTMs follows in section 3.3.10 
3.1.  Modeling trade flows with gravity equations featuring NTM variables 
The gravity equation model is a prominent tool in empirical studies of international trade. The 
model posits that bilateral trade flow can be explained by characteristics of the importing country, 
characteristics of the exporting country, and various trade costs pertaining to the bilateral 
partnership. In particular, the trade costs include fixed costs such as certification and licensing, 
transportation costs (usually measured by the distance between the trading partners), tariff 
schemes, cultural similarity, linguistic difference, historical ties, and NTMs. In particular, we 
review two papers that econometrically estimate the impact of NTMs on international trade. 
3.1.1. MRLs on pesticides and trade in plant products 
Xiong and Beghin (2014) deploy an augmented gravity equation model to quantify the effect of 
MRLs on plant product imports in high-income countries. Specifically, the authors improve upon 
the standard gravity equation model by explicitly capturing the role of MRLs in enhancing 
import demand (via addressing informational issues or lowering health risks). In particular, the 
regression equation is specified as: 
(10) 
ln( ) (1 ) ln(1 ) ln(1 )
max{ ,0} ,
sijt sit sij d ij l ij b ij c ij
sjt sit sjt jt hit sijt
T Q tar b dist b Lang b Bord b Col
MRL MRL MRL fe fe
ϕ θ θ θ θ θ
θγ θβ ε
= − − + − + + + +
− − + + + +
 
where  sijtT  is the trade value of product s from the exporting country i to the importing country j in 
year t, sitQ  is the supply of product s in country i in year t, sijtar  is the tariff rate, ijdist  is the 
                                                 
10The economic development literature addresses the implication of NTMs for labor markets, export performance 
and welfare in developing countries using micro-data based approaches (e.g., Maertens and Swinnen 2009). See 
Beghin, Maertens and Swinnen (2015) for a review of these effects. 
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geographical distance, ijLang  is the common language dummy variable, ijBord  is the common 
border indicator, ijCol  is the historical tie dummy variable, jtfe  is the time-varying fixed effect 
in the importing market, and hitfe  is sectoral fixed effect in the exporting country. Note that the 
variable max{ ,0}sjt sitMRL MRL−  captures the cost of trade associated with more stringent 
MRLs in the importing country relative to those in the exporting country, and the 
variable sjtMRL  captures the potential demand-enhancing effect of MRLs in the importing 
market brought by stringent MRLs. 
Xiong and Beghin use the stringency indices in Li and Beghin (2014) as the 
measurements of MRL restrictiveness (recall section 2.3). The authors identify 61 exporting 
countries, 20 high-income importing countries, and the associated bilateral trade records in 2007, 
2008, 2011, and 2012 of 109 plant products at either the four-digit or six-digit level of the 
Harmonized System classification. In terms of the estimation strategy, the authors implement the 
Heckman two-step procedure to address the absence of trade, due to prohibitive costs implied by 
NTMs or other barriers, and report the effects of MRLs along both the intensive margin of trade 
(or the change in the volume of trade) and the extensive margin of trade (or the change in the 
decision to trade). Table 4 displays the empirical results. 
As shown in Table 4, MRL stringency enhances the demand in the importing market on 
one hand and imposes additional costs on exporters of plant products on the other. The net effect 
is positive is this particular case study, suggesting that NTMs are not necessarily barriers to 
international trade. Table 4 also indicates that, relative to their competitors in the developed 
nations, plant product exporters from developing nations benefit less from the demand 
enhancement but suffer more from the implied costs. From a policy perspective, this finding calls 
for development strategies to further engage agricultural exporters from developing countries as 
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NTMs proliferate in developed countries. 
Table 4. Marginal effects of MRLs on imports of plant products 
 
 
3.1.2. The trade effect of NTMs relative to other domestic and trade policies 
Hoekman and Nicita (2011) investigate the trade effect of NTMs relative to other policies 
affecting international trade. In particular, the authors account for conventional trade policies 
such as tariffs and preferential trade agreements, as well as domestic policies such as 
administrative burdens faced by businesses and the quality of infrastructure in the importing and 
exporting markets.  
Specifically, Hoekman and Nicita (2011) compile bilateral trade records among 105 
countries in 2006. The NTMs are measured by frequency indices as in Kee, Nicita, and 
Olarreaga (2009). The authors also propose a relative preferential margin (RPM) to characterize 
the preferential treatments enjoyed by exporters in a given country relative to their competitors 
elsewhere. In addition, the authors use the Doing Business index to capture the administrative 
costs pertaining to import or export activities.11 Finally, the authors deploy the Logistic 
                                                 
11 The index measures the fees associated with the compliance with procedures to export or import a 20-foot 
container. Data is available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/. 
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Performance Index from the World Bank Indicator to represent the behind-the-border costs faced 
by exporters and importers. 
 Hoekman and Nicita (2011) estimate the gravity equation model via the Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The PPML 
approach allows frequent zero trade records and has been shown to be robust to different patterns 
of heteroscedasticity. Controlling for other factors such as market sizes, other national 
characteristics, and geographical and cultural factors pertaining to the bilateral partnership, the 
reported trade effects of various policies are shown in table 5 across several estimation methods.  
Table 5. Impacts of Various Policies and Trade Costs on Trade in Developing Countries   p    p        p g 
0LS PPML NBREG ZIP ZINB
Trade policy tariﬀ (log)  0.315***  0.198**  0.312***  0.197***  0.299***
0.025 0.044 0.035 0.044 0.032
Trade policy NTB (log) 0.03  0.146***  0.053*  0.146***  0.054**
0.025 0.046 0.028 0.046 0.026
Trade policy RPM (index) 0.016* 0.027*** 0.023** 0.027*** 0.025**
0.01 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.01
DB Import Costs (log)  0.098*  0.324***  0.240***  0.326***  0.245***
0.057 0.094 0.078 0.094 0.07
DB Export Costs (log)  0.394***  0.222**  0.201***  0.224**  0.168***
0.057 0.096 0.07 0.096 0.065
LPI importer (index) 0.357*** 0.408*** 0.279** 0.403*** 0.300***
0.083 0.149 0.109 0.149 0.1
LPI exporter (index) 1.182*** 0.701*** 0.135 0.695*** 0.15
0.087 0.15 0.108 0.15 0.101
Standard errors are in italics
* Signi?cance level of 10%.
** Signi?cance level of 5%.
*** Signi?cance level of 1%.  
Source: Hoekman and Nicita (2011), their table 7. 
As shown in Table 5, imports of developing countries are significantly constrained by 
tariffs, NTB/NTMs, administrative costs (as represented by the Doing Business variable), and 
internal costs from poor logistics (logistics quality is represented by the Logistic Performance 
Index, hence the positive sign). The authors look at the impact of economic development on poor 
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countries when they become middle-income countries with the implied reduction in trade costs 
and improvements in infrastructure and business climate. Reductions in domestic impediments 
have as much importance as reducing trade barriers at the border. The exports of developing 
nations are more impeded by tariffs and low quality of infrastructure than by other policies. This 
provides an interesting context to the impact of NTM/NTBs on trade. The finding suggests that 
lowering the domestic costs pertaining to trade activities is as important as improving market 
access worldwide. 
These two authors also compute mercantilist TRIs as shown in equation (A6) in the 
Annex, but simplified as in Feenstra (1995), focusing on own-price effects and zeroing cross-
price effects (see Kee Nicita and Olarreaga equation (18) for the empirical formula used). The 
MTRI provides a scalar measure of the aggregate trade impact of these various NTMs and tariffs 
in all sectors. They show that developing countries tend to have distortions penalizing trade in 
agriculture relatively more than trade in manufacturing products. NTMs dominate the trade 
impact of tariffs in many countries and most sectors. 
3.2. Welfare analysis with the partial equilibrium approach 
The welfare effects discussed at the beginning of section 1 are often evaluated quantitatively by 
calibrating relatively simple partial equilibrium models to implement policy scenarios in which 
policies such as NTMs are removed. The removal of these NTMs induce changes in domestic 
demand, supply, trade flows, potential external effects and tax revenues which are needed to 
characterize welfare effects. The benefit of using such a simple framework is that the policy 
characterization can be richer and more detailed than in a large-scale model. That is the tradeoff 
often faced by policy analysts.  
Peterson and Orden (2008) provide a well-executed welfare analysis of changes in various 
phytosanitary trade policies within NAFTA affecting avocado trade between Mexico and the 
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United States. They characterize the consumer in the importing country with CES preferences for 
avocados from different sources. The welfare of the consumer is characterized by the equivalent 
variation metric. Production of avocados is characterized by a CET frontier that can shift inward 
if a pest infestation from weevils and fruit flies arises. That is the potential externality which 
could be brought by imported avocados. The expected frequency of pest outbreaks is represented 
by a product of probabilities of various failures in the system (presence of pest in imports, non 
detection at packing, survival of the pest in transport, non detection at the border, etc.) scaled by 
the volume of imports. Domestic producers can control the various pests at a cost. The 
producers’ welfare is estimated by using producer surplus inclusive of pest control and loss of 
productivity with pest outbreaks. Mexican exporters can comply with the SPS measures imposed 
by the United States at some cost of compliance. Chilean avocados are also imported but are not 
potential vector of pest infestation. 
Once fully specified, the model is calibrated using price and quantity data from 2005–06 and 
consensus price elasticities and technical parameters. The model replicates the base year data. 
Typically in these modeling exercises, there are enough undetermined “free” parameters to 
replicate actual baseline data. The model is then used to simulate alternative states of the world 
with policy changes. Import restrictions parametrized in the model are removed and the model 
traces the impact of the policy removal on all endogenous variables (prices, quantities, trade, 
expected pest outbreaks, and associated compliance cost, control cost, and welfare).  
Results from the simulation are shown in table 6. The table shows what happens to avocado 
producers in California, Chile, and Mexico and to consumers under three scenarios, which show 
increasingly lax SPS regulatory systems in the United States, and hence, lower compliance cost 
for Mexican suppliers and lower consumer prices from these cheaper imports. However, higher 
pest outbreaks and associated costs are also implied by these more lax regimes. Domestic 
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producer prices and welfare are affected negatively by the competition from increased Mexican 
imports. Net welfare increases in all scenarios and risk environments. However under “high risk” 
of pest case, the laxest regime is far from being the welfare maximizing one. 
Table 6. Welfare impacts of SPS policy changes under average and high pest risk
scenario
Average 
Risk High Risk
Average 
Risk High Risk
Average 
Risk High Risk
Welfare effects
Producer surplus
California −76.269 −76.401 −76.763 −76.902 −81.586 −102.127
Chile −16.848 −16.844 −17.002 −16.998 −17.551 −16.998
Mexico 5.093 5.094 5.302 5.302 6.236 6.351
U.S. equivalent 
variation 153.721 153.646 156.915 156.836 168.441 156.441
8.0E−06 7.8E−05 0.002 0.016 0.029 0.244
77.452 77.245 80.15 79.918 86.826 54.069
Other fruit fly 
costs Net U.S. 
welfare change
Scenario 1 Scenario 3Scenario 2
 
Source: Peterson and Orden (2008), their table 4. 
Beyond this investigation by Peterson and Orden, many of these partial equilibrium analyses 
of NTM regimes share common characteristics. They are simple but can easily incorporate 
specific and detailed characterizations of NTM policies, trade costs, and institutions. For 
example, Van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette (2009) develop a simple calibrated partial 
equilibrium model to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of mandatory labelling of fish 
consumption in France. They evaluate the impact of a label providing health information 
influencing consumer choice between types of fish exhibiting different levels of health risk from 
heavy metals and also offering some health benefits from omega fats. The policies have some 
trade consequences when they affect the mix of fish types consumed. They use results from a 
laboratory choice experiment that elicited consumer valuation, especially from pregnant women 
for the healthy and risky attributes. Consumers vary by level of concern for health effects. The 
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welfare analysis includes consumer surplus, and profits of two supply chains for sardine and tuna. 
These simple PE models can also incorporate quality differences in a more subtle way 
than larger models. Welfare effects are typically smaller than in large models because one looks 
at one or a few markets. This can be deceptive at first glance. These partial equilibrium models 
are also versatile and can be changed and recalibrated easily and many scenarios can be 
investigated. Larger models tend involve heavier lifting, so to speak.  
3.3. Welfare analysis with general equilibrium model approach 
The Annex introduces the general equilibrium approach to measuring welfare effects of technical 
measures and other distortions in a small, open, distorted economy and generalizes the 
discussion of section 1.1 on welfare analysis using Marshallian surpluses. The TRI is a welfare 
metric providing a tariff scalar measure equivalent to the distortive effects of various distortions 
in an economy while holding welfare at the same level. At a basic level, the TRI captures 
triangles of deadweight losses created by the various distortions impacting trade flows. Kee, 
Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) use their ad valorem equivalent estimates of NTBs to compute TRIs 
for tariffs, domestic policies, and NTBs for a series of countries. We already reviewed these ad 
valorem equivalents of NTBs in sub-section 2.2.2 and showed the formula in equation (6) above. 
Their estimates of NTB AVEs abstract from the facts that technical measures could help mitigate 
some market imperfections and could enhance trade. Hence, all AVEs are positive. To 
implement their TRI estimates they use Feenstra’s (1995) approximation to the TRI. It restricts 
cross-price effects to zero and focuses instead on own-price effects of tariffs, AVE of NTMs, and 
AVEs of domestic subsidies on resource allocation. It then aggregates the dead weight losses of 
these policies over all n sectors following the formula: 
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(11). 
In some sense this simplification is partial equilibrium approximation of a full blown 
general-equilibrium TRI because intermarket effects are not accounted for.12 The advantage of 
this approximation is that it reduces the number of required elasticity estimates to the own-price 
estimates. 
The approximation still aggregates the cumulative effect of various policies on resource 
allocation in each sector and then provides an estimate of the overall welfare effects summing up 
over all sectors.  
The TRI estimates obtained by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga are shown in table 7 for a 
subset of countries. The table also shows mercantilist TRI (denoted OTRI) and market access 
TRIs faced by exporters to the listed country (denoted MA-TRI). We abstract from these trade 
effects as we have discussed trade effects in section 3.1. 
As the table 8 shows, unsurprisingly, the welfare effect of all distortions is larger than the 
effects of tariffs. The interesting aspect is the heterogeneity in the magnitudes across countries 
for both the tariff TRI and for the overall TRI for all distortions. 
                                                 
12 With a few additional assumptions on preferences and production, it is possible to generate minimum 
compensated import price responses to account for some cross-price effects in the TRI (see Beghin, Bureau, and 
Park, 2003). 
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Table 7. TRIs for Tariffs and NTBs 
Country 
code
country 
name OTRI MA-OTRI TRI OTRI MA-OTRI TRI
ALB Albania 0.118 0.022 0.134 0.124 0.34 0.15
-0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.076 -0.013
ARG Argentina 0.13 0.064 0.142 0.181 0.275 0.279
-0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.024 -0.029 -0.037
AUS Australia 0.061 0.095 0.099 0.119 0.147 0.2. 0
-0.004 -0.023 -0.006 -0.02 -0.037 -0.03
BFA Burkina Fas 0.107 0.029 0.123 0.158 0.121 0.268
0 -0.009 0 -0.014 -0.024 -0.035
BGD Bangladesh 0.179 0.028 0.227 0.255 0.346 0.399
-0.005 0 -0.005 -0.022 -0.036 -0.036
BLR Belarus 0.086 0.051 0.109 0.168 0.101 0.312
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.017 -0.016
BOL Bolivia 0.08 0.011 0.086 0.148 0.122 0.272
-0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.022 -0.03 -0.033
BRA Brazil 0.106 0.073 0.131 0.27 0.149 0.497
-0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.023 -0.025 -0.03
BRN Brunei 0.13 0.018 0.551 0.185 0.056 0.596
-0.008 -0.001 -0.027 -0.016 -0.013 -0.032
CAN Canada 0.029 0.028 0.076 0.063 0.072 0.191
-0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.023 -0.037
CHE Switzerland 0.04 0.027 0.175 0.067 0.066 0.247
-0.004 -0.004 -0.018 -0.009 -0.036 -0.016
CHL Chile 0.069 0.022 0.069 0.11 0.158 0.202
0 -0.001 0 -0.01 -0.026 -0.02
CHN China 0.14 0.024 0.211 0.204 0.066 0.343
-0.005 0 -0.011 -0.02 -0.01 -0.028
CIV Cote d'Ivoir 0.095 0.029 0.119 0.315 0.263 0.495
-0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.046 -0.052 -0.044
CMR Cameroon 0.14 0.032 0.161 0.164 0.138 0.224
-0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.027 -0.026
COL Colombia 0.114 0.046 0.134 0.249 0.132 0.456
-0.003 -0.01 -0.004 -0.025 -0.031 -0.049
CRI Costa Rica 0.048 0.079 0.079 0.05 0.202 0.087
-0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.049 -0.024
CZE Czech Rep. 0.043 0.012 0.064 0.049 0.027 0.094
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.015
DZA Algeria 0.131 0.002 0.161 0.392 0.002 0.557
-0.002 0 -0.002 -0.03 -0.001 -0.03
EGY Egypt 0.129 0.026 0.224 0.411 0.088 0.586
-0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.035 -0.015 -0.032
EST Estonia 0.009 0.018 0.049 0.024 0.064 0.132
0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 0.025)
ETH Ethiopia 0.139 0.036 0.185 0.151 0.49 0.222
-0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.01 -0.089 -0.025
EUN ropean Uni 0.017 0.028 0.078 0.079 0.086 0.406
-0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.014 -0.036
GAB Gabon 0.155 0.002 0.178 0.155 0.003 0.178
-0.001 0 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.022
GHA Ghana 0.145 0.017 0.247 0.178 0.321 0.296
-0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 -0.062 -0.026
GTM Guatemala 0.07 0.049 0.098 0.18 0.349 0.356
-0.001 -0.014 -0.001 -0.021 -0.084 -0.029
HKG Hong Kong 0 0.054 0 0.017 0.174 0.122
0 -0.001 0 -0.005 -0.025 -0.017
Tariffs & NTBsTariffs only
Trade Restrictiveness Indices
 
Source: Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2009), their table 4. 
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Table 8 summarizes the NTM measures and methodologies to assess trade and welfare 
effects reviewed in sections 2 and 3.  
Table 8: Summary of the Literature Reviewed on NTMs and Their Trade and Welfare 
Effects 
Focus and approach Strengths / weaknesses Examples 
Measures of NTMS 
Index of heterogeneity and 
stringency of MRLs  
Stringency difficult if no international 
standard; can quantify protectionist 
countries; limited coverage of NTM 
types 
Winchester et al. (2012); Li and 
Beghin (2014); de Faria and 
Wieck; Ferro et al. (2015)  
Frequency and coverage 
ratios of NTMs 
All NTMs treated alike; frequency 
ratios forego variation; exists for a 
large set of countries, new MAST data 
set allows to disaggregate by type of 
measure; good for stylized facts 
(sectors, measure types) 
Nicita and Gourdon (2013); Kee 
et al. (2009); Beghin et al. 
(2015) 
AVEs of NTMs Based on frequency measures of core 
NTMs; use older data; all NTMs 
within a country have a similar effect; 
New approach allows for negative 
AVEs of NTMs 
Kee et al. 2009; Beghin et al. 
2015 
Price wedge measure Actual price data; uses new MAST 
dataset and RTA dataset; looks at deep 
integration 
Cadot and Gourdon (2016); 
Cadot et al. (2015);  
Transparency measures ; 
harmonization 
 Lejarraga and Shepherd (2013); 
Lejarraga et al. (2013); Disdier 
et al. (2014); Czubala et al. 
(2009); Vancauteren and de 
Frahan (2011); Vancauteren 
(2013) 
Estimates of NTM impact on bilateral trade across nations and welfare 
Large econometric studies 
using panel or cross 
sections of countries, many 
sectors, using simple 
proxies of total NTM 
regimes  in gravity-type 
models 
 
 
Many abstract from market 
imperfections; recent investigations 
allow for trade enhancing effects and 
separate supply and demand shifts. 
includes and  identifies several sources 
of trade costs (tariffs, distance, other 
trade costs) 
broad brush; Mixed evidence on NTM 
trade cost; traditionally could explain 
why estimated NTM could be trade-
enhancing, a regular finding 
Various proxies used for NTM regime 
Some derive TRI and MTRI measures 
Econometric: Hoekman and 
Nicita (2011); Kee et al. 2009; 
Li and Beghin (2012); Beghin et 
al. (forthcoming);  
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we reviewed various methodologies developed by economists to quantify NTMs 
and evaluate their impacts on international trade and social welfare. The economic analyses of 
NTMs call for advanced approaches because NTMs differ from tariffs in three major aspects. 
First, NTMs contain a large set of policy instruments, ranging from border control measures, to 
marketing requirements, to product or process standards. Second, some NTMs affect 
stakeholders on both sides of the market and therefore bear complex implications for trade and 
welfare. Third, certain NTMs serve public objectives such as risk mitigation and environmental 
sustainability that are not fully reflected in market forces. 
We first presented a simple economic framework to conceptualize the above-mentioned 
complexity of NTMs and their effects on demand, supply, prices, trade, and welfare. We then 
reviewed several empirical approaches that quantify NTMs and their characteristics such as 
transparency of regulatory regimes and also those that translate NTMs into tariff or subsidy 
equivalents. We also review prominent econometric and simulation-based methods to assess the 
trade and welfare effects of NTMs.  
We have highlighted the advantages and drawbacks of the various measures and 
approaches and the progress made to better investigate these technical measures. The recent 
analysis of deep integration and its interface on technical measures and regulatory regimes is a 
major development. The increasing recognition is that market imperfections may exist and that 
some technical measures do improve welfare and allocative efficiency. It is an important 
milestone. The policy debate has shifted to discussing what NTMs to keep and how to streamline 
NTM regimes rather than dismissing them as simple trade barriers. Still sorting out good and bad 
NTMs requires careful analyses and characterization of these regimes. This characterization of 
technical measures remains difficult and future research perfecting the characterization of NTMs 
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and allowing for more meaningful aggregation of these NTMs will be influential if successful. 
Most econometric analyses suffer from omitted variable problems because they only use 
incomplete characterization of NTM regimes or sub-regimes such as some specific SPS or TBT 
measures. The new database collected for the MAST project appears promising in that regard.  
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Annex. Derivation of economy-wide effects of technical measures and TRIs 
We derive an economy-wide framework to show the impact of technical measures in a small 
distorted economy ridden by tariffs and production subsidies, and in the presence of potential 
external effects in demand. The framework slightly extends Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2015) 
by having technical measures influencing both domestic and foreign suppliers. As explained 
before, technical measure can influence the externality (a shift in demand)—it potentially raises 
the cost of production at home (a shift of the marginal cost of production) and abroad (an 
increase in the price at the border). In addition, the pathways of the welfare effects are through 
the externality, the impact on prices, and the impact on general-equilibrium income, a new 
dimension.  
These effects of technical measures on the economy are aggregated in the change in the 
TRI, which indicates the tariff ad valorem equivalent to all policy interventions in the economy 
(tariffs, technical measures, other distortions) and holds welfare constant. It is a welfare metric 
proportional to conventional Marshallian surplus measures indicating the welfare cost associated 
with the policy interventions. The MTRI provides a tariff equivalent to the same distortions but 
holding the value of trade constant rather than welfare. In this latter case, the metric focuses on 
the impact of multiple distortions on trade. 
The utility of the aggregate consumer is u(x, H(NTM)) with market goods x and a 
negative externality H. The externality is impacted by technical measure(s) NTM. The usual 
derivative properties are / 0;  / 0; ( ) with / 0.x Hu u x u u H H H NTM H NTM= ∂ ∂ > = ∂ ∂ < = ∂ ∂ <  
Consumer prices p comprise the world price wp assumed parametric for a small country, a tariff τ, 
and the price equivalent t of the domestic NTM imposed at the border on foreign suppliers 
allowing them to sell in the domestic market, or p = wp + τ + t(NTM).  
The expenditure function of the consumer is ( , , ) ( ' | ; )
x
e p u H Min p x u u H H= ≥ ≤ , with 
the usual derivative properties 
/ ( , , ( )) 0,  and / 0.p He e p x p u H NTM e e H= ∂ ∂ = ≥ = ∂ ∂ ≥ Homogeneity and curvature properties 
in prices lead to p’epp=0, eH=p’epH, eu=p’epu ; epNTM = epH HNTM , and f’eppf ≤ 0 for any arbitrary 
vector f of similar dimension as p and with epj denoting the partial derivative of the consumption 
vector with respect to variable j. The marginal damage associated with the externality, eH, is 
positive holding utility constant. The marginal utility of income is positive implying that the 
partial derivative eu is positive.  
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The impact of technical measures on demand is ambiguous. The demand enhancing case 
(outward shift of demand for good n) is epnNTM = epnHNTM > 0. Protectionism is implied by HNTM = 
0, that is, the policy does not address the externality. Other cases include a reduction in 
externality but no shift in demand (no impact of the externality on a particular consumption of 
good n) (HNTM<0, epnH = 0), or a reduction in demand for good n, (e.g., a mandated warning 
label), which reduces the consumption and the externality (HNTM<0, epnH > 0).  
On the production side, domestic supply decisions in competitive industries are derived 
from the gdp function  with y being the output 
vector, z  the vector of the economy’s fixed endowments and pp the vector of producer prices. 
Producer prices include production subsidies, s, such as farm subsidies, not seen by consumers, 
( )pp wp t NTM sτ= + + + . Technical measures NTM affect the feasible set and the resource used 
to produce goods optimally. Envelope and homogeneity properties are  
/ ; ' ; ' / ' 0; ' 0 for any p p p p pp p pp ppgdp gdp p p gdp gdp p y p p gdp f gdp f f= ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = = ≥ . In 
addition, we have /pNTM NTMgdp y y NTM= = ∂ ∂ . The latter derivative captures the shift in supply 
brought by the technical measure(s). If the technical measure reduces the feasible set, then 
supply will shift to the left and yNTM is negative. Conceivably, although less frequent, NTM could 
also shift supply to the right if a production externality was present before the measure was put 
in place (e.g., exotic pest policies increase yield once the pest is controlled as in Peterson and 
Orden, 2008).  
Imports m are . The latter 
equation captures the three effects of NTM on imports via price p with t(NTM), externality H, 
and supply y. One can differentiate imports m with respect to all the arguments while holding 
utility constant. This step provides a basic trade impact induced by changes in the determinants 
of imports, including technical measures and other policy interventions in the economy, holding 
utility constant. Not all these determinants have to change at once of course. For a single good 
case (good n) determined by its own price we obtain 
(A1)
( / ) ( / )
[( / )( / ) ( / )( / ) / ] ( / )
n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n n n n
dm m dp d y p ds
m dp t NTM x H H NTM y NTM dNTM y z dz
τ= ∂ − ∂ ∂ +
∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
. 
Equation (A1) also suggests that an empirical strategy will be necessary to separate the 
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impact of technical measures in a given sector n, NTMn, on supply yn and demand xn to identify 
demand enhancing effects form supply shifts induced by higher cost of production under the 
technical measures.  
Next, the balance of trade function B is used to derive welfare implications. Function B 
indicates the amount of foreign exchange necessary to sustain utility u given NTM, wp, z, s, τ and 
externality H. Homogeneity in prices and envelope properties of e and gdp lead to a simple 
expression of B as follows: 
(A2)  
1.2. Trade restrictiveness indices with externality 
The TRI is a scalar T equivalent (holding utility constant) to technical measures NTM, tariffs τ, 
and production subsidies s to apply as a tariff surcharge on world prices such that:  
(A3)  0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( (1 ), (1 ), , , (0),0, )
( ( ), ( ) , , , ( ), , )
B wp T wp T wp z H u
B wp t NTM wp t NTM s wp z H NTM NTM u Bτ τ
+ + =
+ + + + + =
.  
The tariff surcharge accounts for several components: tariffs τ, domestic production 
subsidies s, and technical measures NTM through three conduits, the demand shift via HNTM, the 
supply shift via yNTM, and the “protectionist” effect from raising foreign unit cost by t(NTM) to 
satisfy technical measure NTM. 
Following Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995), we hold u constant and differentiate 
equation (A3) with respect to T, τ, s, and NTM to derive the change in T rather than T. This step 
yields: 
(A4) ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '[( ) (( ) /  - ) ] / ( ),p p p pNTMp p H NTM pp p p pdT B B d B ds B B t NTM B H B dNTM B wp B wpτ= + + + + ∂ ∂ + +  
with partial derivatives ' 'p ppB eτ= − , 
' '( )p pppB s gdpτ= + , 
'( ( )) 0H pHB wp t NTM e= + > , and 
NTM NTMB y= . 
Equation (A4) is a welfare metric indicating the consequences of changing policy 
interventions in the economy. It shows that welfare effects of the NTM component is the sum of 
three elements: the “protectionist” effect relative to foreign goods with Harberger triangles 
through a tariff equivalent t, which is increasing in NTM, a demand effect via reduced externality 
H (a shift of demand), and a change in the feasible set to produce the good affected by the 
measure and shifting supply. The sign of this protectionist effect on welfare (and imports) is 
clear, but the effect of NTM via H on welfare (and trade) is potentially positive; the effect via y 
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on welfare is often negative by increasing cost and the corresponding impact on trade is then 
positive in these cases. The sum of the three effects is presumably ambiguous and has to be 
determined empirically. 
From dT, we recover the TRI T equivalent to the initial tariffs, subsidies, and technical 
measures relative to a world with all policies set to 0. It is done by integrating both sides of (A4) 
with respect to T going from zero to T and policies going from (0,0,0) to (τ, s, NTM). We get 
(A5) ' ' ' ') /  - )( ) (( / () '( )p NTM NTMp p p Hp pp ppp p pB B t NTM B H B NTMT B B B s wp gdp e wpτ′ ′ +′= + + + ∂ ∂ + − .    
If NTM is a purely protectionist policy not addressing an externality, and if domestic producers 
incur no cost or less cost than foreign producers to satisfy the measure, then BHHNTM =BNTM=0 
(no demand and supply shifts). In this case, the dead weight loss from the tariff equivalent 
t(NTM) is added to the sum of deadweight losses. If the technical measure truly addresses an 
externality and enhances demand and only increases the domestic cost of production moderately, 
then the measure could lead to a welfare gain other things being equal. Removing the technical 
measure decreases welfare. If the latter effect dominates the distortionary effect of tariffs and 
subsidies, then dT is negative and T cannot be recovered using (A5). Then the change in TRI, dT, 
is the form of choice to measure welfare implications. 
To derive trade effects in general equilibrium, we hold aggregate imports (wp’m) 
constant and derive the MTRI to look at the full trade impact of technical measures. Recall 
equation (A1) looks at a single market and involves import changes holding utility constant. The 
MTRI yields the tariff equivalent to all distortions holding aggregate trade unchanged but 
allowing for welfare variation. Utility is then endogenous. The MTRI is 
(A6) ''[ /  + ) ]( ( '/ )
M
p
NTp p
merc
c H N pp TM
T wp t NTMm y s x H ym wp m wTM pNτ= ∂ ∂ −− + . 
These indices are those we refer to in section 3, in which we discuss the empirical computation 
of welfare and trade impacts of NTM policies based on econometric estimates of the impact of 
trade distortions on trade flows. 
